Raffaello Cortina Editore

Starting from some theoretical contributions on Identity as a themein psychoanalysis, an attempt is made to underline the relationship existing between the Self as unique and continuous, and the Self as multiple and discontinuous. The multiplicity and discontinuity of the Self is considered in the light of recent contributions from Infant Research and neuroscience, which validate the hypothesis that development takes place within an intersubjective context through the mutual recognition of the two subjectivities in relation to each other. Moreover, it is stressed that from a relational/intersubjective perspective the Self is considered as the expression of a dialectical and creative tension between the Self asunique and continuous and the multiple and discontinuous Self. This tension finds its synthesis in the concept of the Third, a position in which we recognise the Other as similar. Furthermore, the ways out of the ruptures of Thirdness are considered, namely both dissociation and enactment.KEY WORDS: Dissociation, enactment, identity, intersubjectivity, mutual recognition, Self-Other

In the psychoanalytic view identity is a complex event, neither substance nor concept, but a subjective feeling: the sense of self. Freud speaks of identity as to an obscure identity of being. The author proposes the model of two identities: the primary sense of self and the social feeling of identity. The primary identity arises from the primitive self-experience, which the subject experiences in his own body. It is the basis on which psychic life rests in the work of forming symbolic identity. The vicissitudes of identity, in the course of historical development, encounter blocks and failures. In situations of failure, the feeling of identity remains locked in a narcissistic enclave. This enclosure generates identity disorders and the rejection of otherness.KEYWORDS: Bodily self-experience, identity hatred, mirroring, primary sense of self, social recognition.

The debate about Winnicott’s relationship to Metapsychology is raised in the margins of the research project promoted and led by Riolo (2015-2020). Moving from the consistent dialogue between Fulgencio and Girard, the author revisits Winnicott’s theory of instincts in a constant dialectics with the Freud’s one. After reviewing Winnicott’s conceptual work, the author argues that the theory of destructiveness, different from Freud’s, is crucial and remarkable for the elaboration of some of the most original  concepts, such as intermediate area and potential space.KEY WORDS: Drive/instinctual theory, Fulgencio-Girard debate (2007-2017), metapsychology, Winnicott-Freud comparison.